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I. INTRODUCTION
In February 2011, the television game show Jeopardy! aired a three-day
contest between Ken Jennings and Brad Rutter, two of the show's all-time
grand champions, and Watson, an IBM supercomputer that understands
questions posed in natural language. 1 At the end of the three-day competition,
Watson handily defeated the two grand champs with a final tally of $77,147 to
Jennings' $24,000 and Rutter's $21,600.2
The IBM researchers who designed and built Watson admitted that the
machine benefitted from what they called the "buzzer factor." 3 Though
* J.D. Candidate, The Ohio State University Moritz College of Law, expected 2013;
B.A., New York University, 2008. 1 thank: Professors Steven Davidoff, Dale Oesterle and
Paul Rose, all of whom provided invaluable insight into financial markets and regulation;
Professor Douglas Berman, who instilled in me the phrase "Write Tight"; and my parents,
brother Ryan, and entire family for their advice, encouragement and unconditional support in
all of my pursuits.
I See John Markoff, Computer Wins on 'Jeopardy!': Trivial, It's Not, N.Y. TIMES, Feb.
17, 2011, at Al.
2 1d at A23.
3 1d.
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Jennings and Rutter were skilled in anticipating the light indicator that signals
when it is possible to "buzz in" to give a response, Watson could hit the buzzer
in as little as ten milliseconds. 4 Thus, Watson's advantage was not that it was
smarter than Jennings or Rutter, but that it could process the clues and buzz in
faster than either of the human contestants. 5
Jennings, famous for setting a Jeopardy! record of seventy-four consecutive
wins, jocularly acknowledged in his final written response of the contest, "I, for
one, welcome our new computer overlords." 6 The response may have been
lighthearted and funny, but it was also perceptive and farsighted. Jennings
himself stated, "It's not about the results; this is about being part of the future." 7
Shortly after the episodes aired, bloggers posed questions regarding
implications of Watson's potential uses.8
Even before IBM used complex algorithms to create Watson, 9 Wall Street
has used algorithmic supercomputers for trading on financial markets. 10 This
trading method, better known as "algorithmic trading," and more specifically its
subset "high frequency trading" (HFT), accounts for 60-70% of daily trades on
today's U.S. financial exchanges, where as recently as 2005 it accounted for just
a fifth of daily trading." As of this writing, HFT has not been officially defined
4 1d. Watson beat the human players to the buzzer in 24 out of 30 Double Jeopardy
questions on the competition's last day. Id.
5 Watson by no means was correct in every response it gave-sometimes painfully
incorrect. On the second day's Final Jeopardy question, the clue for the category "U.S.
Cities" was: "Its largest airport is named for a WWII hero; its second largest for a WWII
battle." The correct response was "What is Chicago?" but Watson wrote "What is
Toronto?????" Jeopardy!: The IBM/Challenge: Day 2 (Sony Pictures, Inc. Feb. 15, 2011).
6 Markoff, supra note 1, at Al. Jennings borrowed the quip from The Simpsons: Deep
Space Homer (Fox television broadcast Feb. 24, 1994).
7 Markoff, supra note 1, at A23.
8 See, e.g., Douglas A. Berman, How /fMight IBM's "Watson" Do as a Sentecing [sic]
Judge (or a Law Clerk)?, SENT'G L. & POL'Y (Feb. 18, 2011, 3:33 PM), http:/sentencing.
typepad.com/sentencing_law andjpolicy/2011/02/how-might-ibms-watson-do-as-a-
sentecing-judge-or-a-law-clerk.html (discussing Watson's implications in the legal and
medical fields); Quant: Will IBA Get into HFT High Frequency Trading?, QUANTLABS.NET
(Feb. 23, 2011, 1:40 PM), http://quantlabs.net/labs/articles/high-frequency-trading/723-
quant-will-ibm-get-into-hft-high-frequency-trading
9 The names and photos of the IBM algorithms team who built Watson can be found at
http://www-03.ibm.com/innovation/us/watson/research-team/algorithms.html.
1OSee generally Michael J. McGowan, Note, The Rise of Computerized High
Frequency Trading: Use and Controversy, 9 DUKE L. & TECH. REV. 16 (2010).
1 1 It is difficult to pinpoint an exact percentage. However, by most estimates HFT
accounts for a significantly large percentage of daily volume on the equity exchanges. For a
more recent estimation, see Andrew G. Haldane, Exec. Dir., Fin. Stability and member of
the interim Fin. Policy Comm., Bank of Eng., Speech Given at the International Economic
Association Sixteenth World Congress (July 8, 2011), available at http://
www.bankofengland.co.uk/publications/Documents/speeches/2011 speech509.pdf; see also
IRENE ALDRIDGE, HIGH-FREQUENCY TRADING: A PRACTICAL GUIDE TO ALGORITHMIC
STRATEGIES AND TRADING SYSTEMS 1 (2010); Charles Duhigg, Stock Traders Find Speed
Pays, in Milliseconds, N.Y. TIMES, July 24, 2009, at Al; Dave Fry, High-Frequency Trading
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by U.S. regulators. 12 However, certain features are indicative of its strategies:
very high order amounts; rapid order cancellation; a flat position at the end of
the trading day; extracting very low margins per trade; and trading at ultra-fast
speeds.13
Like IBM's Watson, speed is the key advantage of I-FT. A decade ago, the
average trade execution time on the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) was
twenty seconds; today, it is approximately one second. 14 One reason for this
dramatic drop in the average is that some HIFT platforms can execute a trade
faster than the blink of an eye-trading speeds have increased from
milliseconds to microseconds (millionths of a second). 15 The dramatic speed at
which HIFT operates allows huge trading volume over short periods: one
startling analogy is that if supermarkets ran HFT programs, the average
household could complete its shopping for a lifetime in less than a second. 16
Still Controls the Tape: Dave's Daily, THE STREET (Oct. 21, 2011, 7:03 PM),
http://www.thestreet.com/story/ 11285083/ 1 /high-frequency-trading-still-controls-the-tape-
daves-daily.html. For additional discussion regarding the wide range of estimates for HFT
activity level, see Large Trader Reporting, 76 Fed. Reg. 46,960, 49,961 n.8 (Aug. 3, 2011)
(to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 240 and 249).
12See Press Release, U.S. Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n, Commodity Futures
Trading Commission Votes to Establish a New Subcommittee of the Technology Advisory
Committee (TAC) to focus on High Frequency Trading (Feb. 9, 2012), available at
http://www.cftc.gov/PressRoom/PressReleases/pr6178-12. In May 2012, the TAC proposed
a draft definition for HFT:
High frequency trading is a form of automated trading that employs:
(a) algorithms for decision making, order initiation, generation, routing, or
execution, for each individual transaction without human direction;
(b) low-latency technology that is designed to minimize response times.
including proximity and co-location services;
(c) high speed connections to markets for order entry: and
(d) high message rates (orders, quotes or cancellations).
U.S. Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n, Presentation by the CFTC Technical Advisory
Committee, Sub-Committee on Automated and High Frequency Trading-Working Group I
at 3 (June 20, 2012), available at http://www.cftc.gov/ucm/groups/public/@newsroom/
documents/file/wglpresentation062012.pdf.
1 3 PETER GOMBER ET AL., DEUTSCHE BORSE GROUP, HIGH-FREQUENCY TRADING 15
(2011), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract id-1858626.
14 Haldane, supra note 11, at 4. This Note implicitly focuses on high frequency equities
trading; however, HFT is used in a variety of financial markets, such as commodities and
foreign exchange. See, e.g., BANK FOR INT'L SETTLEMENTS, MKTS. COMM., HIGH-
FREQUENCY TRADING IN THE FOREIGN EXCHANGE MARKET 5 (2011), available at
http://www.bis.org/publ/mktc05.pdf; Javier Blas, Commodity Market's Algorithmic
Challenge, FIN. TIMES (Mar. 26, 2012, 10:42 AM), available at http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/
s/0/79722992-75 Of-1ie 1 -90d 1-00144feab49a.html#axzz20c MCI szk.15 Haldane, supra note 11, at 5.
16 Id.
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Critics believe that high trading volume and microsecond trade execution
contributes to volatility in financial markets, 17 while proponents argue HFT
increases market efficiency, provides liquidity, and actually stabilizes market
systems. 18 This Note argues that much of the real danger behind HFT is the way
in which it taints the public's perception of U.S. equity markets. Therefore,
regulators should encourage HFT transparency, and impose rules that limit the
possibility of a market failure similar to the flash crash of May 6, 2010.19
Part Ii of this Note describes HFT's primary features, and explains that it is
not a monolithic trading technique, but consists of various strategies in constant
flux to adapt to a highly competitive trading environment. It argues that
understanding the differences between HFT strategies is crucial: although some
strategies in fact benefit the market by reducing spreads and improving price
efficiency, other strategies can be used to manipulate prices and must be
regulated more closely. Part III examines the flash crash of 2010-critics'
primary justification in arguing that HFT creates volatility- to show that HFT
did not in fact trigger that event. Rather, HFT acting as the market's primary
liquidity providers actually became liquidity takers during the rapid uncertainty
of the event, withdrawing from markets thereby causing a liquidity crisis.
Though HFT was not to blame at the outset, the total lack of accurate price
information during the flash crash poses a fundamental problem to U.S. equities
markets: if the markets are at risk of whimsical computers causing pricing
uncertainty, investors have little incentive to risk their capital in such an
environment. The threat to U.S. equities and its potential spillover into U.S.
consumer confidence is the justification for HFT regulation. 20 Part IV discusses
regulations that will improve transparency and limit volatility, reducing the
downside risks 1-FT poses to the markets, while maintaining its upside benefits.
17 See Daniel Indiviglio, Does High-Frequency Trading Cause Wild Stock Swings?,
ATLANTIC (Aug. 17, 2011), http://www.theatlantic.com/business/archive/2011/08/does-high-
frequency-trading-cause-wild-stock-swings/243772/.
1 8 ALDRIDGE, supra note 11, at 2.
19 See The Flash Crash: Autopsy, ECONOMIST, Oct. 9, 2010, at 107. The article
discusses the joint report issued by the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) and the
Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC) in October 2010, and concludes by saying
that the report "provides some vindication for high-frequency trading firms, which had been
widely blamed for the mayhem .... [But] [flast as they are, they may not be able to outpace
regulators." Id. at 108.20 See Daniel indiviglio, The Trading Game Is Causing the Manic Market, ATLANTIC
(Aug. 11, 2011), http://www.theatlantic.com/business/archive/2011/08/the-trading-game-is-
causing-the-manic-market/243488/ ("It's always scary to see the Dow market fall by 500
points repeatedly .... This sort of erratic stock market behavior is terrible for consumer
confidence. Americans worry that their savings aren't safe, so they'll likely cut
spending ... ").
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II. DEFINING HIGH FREQUENCY TRADING: EVOLUTION AND LOGISTICS
In order to establish an HFT regulatory regime, it is necessary to define it.21
Describing its roots and recognizing basic IFT logistics are key factors in
understanding it.
A. The Need for Speed (and Volume): HFT's Distinctive Feature
As recently as twenty years ago, most financial markets operated on
physical trading floors on which humans interacted face-to-face. 22 Today, the
heart of most financial markets is an air-conditioned warehouse filled with
computers, where machines operate as "matching engines" to process buy and
sell orders and execute trades when orders are matched. 23 Furthermore, equity
markets have increasingly fragmented, where investors can trade on more than
half a dozen exchanges, multilateral trading platforms, and "dark pools," in
which large institutional investors trade in closed trading platforms in order to
keep their trades quiet so as not to affect public pricing information.24
Accompanying these structural changes has been technological
advancement, with exponential increases in computing power. 25 These
21 In fact, the CFTC's Technology Advisory Committee (TAC) established a
Subcommittee on Automated and High Frequency Trading to develop recommendations
regarding HFT's definition within the context of the broader field of automated trading. See
Press Release, Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n, supra note 12. The CFTC's ultimate
goal is to assess the impact of HFT in CFTC-regulated markets. Id.
22 Donald MacKenzie, Hi-ow to Make Money in Microseconds, LONDON REV. BOOKS,
May 19, 2011, at 16. Mackenzie discusses the superseding importance placed on the
warehouses storing these computers over the actual physical exchanges, citing the NYSE as
an example. Id ("The matching engines of the [NYSE] ... aren't in the exchange's century-
old Broad Street headquarters ... but in a giant new 400,000-square-foot plain-brick data
centre ... classed as part of the critical infrastructure of the United States.").
2 3 Id. While these machines have led many to believe that the role of floor traders will
be obsolete in the near future, the NYSE recently made a significant capital investment in
brand new posts for human-designated market makers on its trading floor. James Armstrong,
Designated Market Making Alive and Well at NYSE, TRADERS MAG. ONLINE NEWS (Dec. 23,
2011), http://www.tradersmagazine.com/news/market-maker-nyse-trading- 109684-1 .html.
The importance of human market makers on an exchange's floor is illustrated in the 2010
flash crash: these NYSE traders were able to slow down sell-side activity, preventing prices
from falling as low as they did on other exchanges, such as the NASDAQ. Id.24 Haldane, supra note 11, at 4; see also HAROLD BRADLEY & ROBERT E. LITAN, EWING
MARION KAUFFMAN FOUNDATION, CHOKING THE RECOVERY: WHY NEW GROWTH
COMPANIES AREN'T GOING PUBLIC AND UNRECOGNIZED RISKS OF FUTURE MARKET
DISRUPTIONS 23 (2010), available at http://www.kauffman.org/uploadedFiles/etf studyl I1-
8-10.pdf. To illustrate the extent to which trading has dispersed across markets, Haldane
notes that in 2005, the NYSE accounted for 80% of the trading volume for NYSE-listed
securities. Haldane, szpra note 11, at 4. Contrast this with February 2011, where the trading
share of the NYSE dropped to just 24% of volume for stocks that are listed on that exchange.
Id. 2 5 See Haldane, supra note 11, at 5.
2012]
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advances have manifested in speed. Trade execution times have fallen
dramatically since the 1960s and '70s, where it could take a minute or longer
for a trade to be completed. 26 Compare this to the period between 2005 and
2009, when the average trade execution time on the NYSE fell by more than
tenfold, from 10.1 seconds to just 0.7 second. 27
Since timescales have been reduced into significantly smaller increments,
the importance of space has changed as well. Only a few years ago, when
traders' frame of reference was in terms of hour or minute, it was common to
proclaim the "end of geography" in financial markets-a trader's location in the
world in relation to the exchange on which he executed trades was of little
consequence in "slow" markets. 28 However, in a market with reduced
timescales, the distance a trader is located from an exchange's matching engine
computers is increasingly important.2 9 The shorter the length of the cable
connecting traders to exchanges' matching engines, the faster the trade can be
executed. 30 Trading firms have recognized this fact, as well as the exchanges
themselves. Today, exchanges offer space as close as physically possible to
their matching engines, where firms can locate their own servers. 3 1 This scheme
is known as "co-location," and a single rack on which to place a server can cost
$10,000 per month. 32
2 6 BRADLEY & LITAN, supra note 24, at 13.
271d. at 13-14; see also Concept Release on Equity Market Structure, 75 Fed. Reg.
3594, 3595 (proposed Jan. 21, 2010) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pt. 242). The significant
drop in trading execution times has changed time measurement in the markets. In 2007, the
prevalent trading time unit was the millisecond; today, time is often measured in
microseconds (millionths of a second). MacKenzie, supra note 22, at 16. To illustrate this
point, MacKenzie provides an example of the London Stock Exchange boasting that its new
Turquoise trading platform can process an order in as little as 124 microseconds. Id.
2 8 MacKenzie, supra note 22, at 16.
2 9 See id.
30 Haldane, supra note 11, at 5 6 ("Every 100 miles might add a milli-second to
estimated execution times."). For example, assume a trader's offices are in Chicago, and that
the trader wants to trade on the NYSE. The trader is around 800 miles away from the
NYSE's matching engines in Mahwah, New Jersey. Sending an order at that distance takes
approximately sixteen milliseconds. This is a huge delay in the HFT sphere, putting that
trader at a disadvantage to other traders located nearer the NYSE's Mahwah computer
storage facility. For this hypothetical, see MacKenzie, supra note 22.
31 Haldane, supra note 11, at 6.
32 MacKenzie, supra note 22, at 16-17. Co-location is a big earner for the exchanges.
Id. at 17. Presumably, the exchanges have incentive to encourage this evolution of speed.
The NASDAQ, for instance, introduced computer cabinets with chimney stacks that channel
heat exhaust from customers' servers to allow more computing power in the racks. Tom
Steinert-Threlkeld, Nasdaq Data Center Introduces Computing Cabinets with Chimneys,
SEC. TECH. MONITOR (Feb. 7, 2012), http://www.securitiestechnologymonitor.com/news/
nasdaq-omx-computer-chimneys-40gbps-29976-1 .html. Even the precise location of a server
within an exchange's computer facility is a sensitive matter for HFT firms. MacKenzie,
supra note 22, at 17. The NYSE, for instance, takes great effort in ensuring that no single
spot within its computer center is better than any other in terms of access speed. Id.
1462 [Vol. 73:6
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The ever-greater emphasis on speed in the new, technology-driven financial
market structure is what some have labeled an arms race, or a "race to zero" 33 :
"[t]he new trading frontier is nano-seconds-billionths of a second. And the
twinkle in technologists' (unblinking) eye is pico-seconds-trillionths of a
second." '34
This emphasis on speed is the primary defining aspect to high frequency
trading: it is the main difference between traditional investment management
and HFT. 35 It also distinguishes HFT from other algorithmic trading
strategies. 36 HFT is a subset of algorithmic trading, where both use programmed
algorithms to execute automated order submissions and automated order
management. 37 However, it is common for a non-HFT algorithmic strategy to
hold traded securities for days, weeks or months, whereas HFT traders usually
end the trading day flat, with no significant holdings. 3 8 Furthermore, ultra-fast
trading speeds are not necessary in a non-HFT algorithmic strategy; 39 HFT, on
the other hand, uses strategies that require speed to gain advantages in the
market.
Speed allows for increased frequency in opening and closing positions in
various securities, which subsequently allows HFT systems to profitably
capture small deviations in securities prices. 40 Typically, HFT traders collect
tiny gains, usually measured in fractions of a cent, in large volumes of shares
traded throughout the day. For example, in 1988, the typical market maker
33 Haldane, supra note 11, at 5. "Zero" refers to zero latency, where the time it takes
from sending an order to its actual execution reaches its natural limit, the speed of light. Id.
34 1d. For additional discussion on the importance of speed in trading, see Joel
Hasbrouck & Gideon Saar, Low-Latency Trading 1 (Johnson School, Working Paper No.
35-2010, 2012), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract-id-1695460
("[B]eing faster than other traders ... can create profit opportunities by enabling a prompt
response to news or market activity.").
3 5 ALDRIDGE, supra note 11, at 26 27.
36 Algorithmic trading, often used by large institutional investors, "involves splitting a
trade into multiple orders in order to reduce visibility and market impact [on pricing]"; the
decision to initiate the main trade may or may not be automated. EDGAR PEREZ, THE SPEED
TRADERS: AN INSIDER'S LOOK AT THE NEW HIGH-FREQUENCY PHENOMENON THAT IS
TRANSFORMING THE INVESTING WORLD 18 (2011); see also MacKenzie, supra note 22, at 16
(discussing a phenomenon when executing large orders known as "slippage," where prices
rise when attempting to buy in large blocks and fall when attempting to sell in large blocks;
algorithms are used to break up orders to limit these effects).
3 7 GOMBER ET AL., supra note 13, at 14; see also RISHI K. NARANG, INSIDE THE BLACK
Box: THE SIMPLE TRUTH ABOUT QUANTITATIVE TRADING 105-07 (2009). Automated trading
involves inputting certain command triggers into an algorithm, that when satisfied,
automatically place an order. PEREZ, supra note 36, at 18. A small trade might be placed
directly into the market, whereas a large order might be passed off to an execution algorithm
to limit price impact. Id.; see also ALDRIDGE, supra note 11 at 277-80 (briefly discussing
"slippage" and large order price impact).
38 GOMBER ET AL., supra note 13, at 16.
39See id
4 0 ALDRIDGE, supra note 11, at 26 27.
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netted roughly four cents in profit for every share traded; today, the typical HFT
nets 7/100 of a cent or less per share traded. 4 1 HFT traders are willing to take
98% less than market makers in previous years because technological
advancements in speed allow for huge trading volumes to make up the
difference. 42 Booking small gains consistently throughout the trading day
results in a reasonable gain by market close.43
While speed and volume broadly define HFT, examining only these two
features limits understanding and regulating it. HFT encompasses a range of
strategies, all of which use speed and volume in different capacities. 44
B. Understanding HFT Strategies as a Basis for Regulation
fIFT employs strategies that rely on fast execution. The SEC acknowledges
that different 1-IFT strategies exist, and is correct to examine the various
strategies as each requires a different regulatory approach. 45 On the other hand,
the universe of HIFT strategies is "diverse and opaque"; 46 regulating HIFT solely
on strategies in a regulatory environment where HIFT data is not easily
accessible would prove difficult.4 7 Furthermore, in order to remain competitive,
1-IFT algorithms constantly adapt in the rapidly developing HFT programming
world: an HIFT algorithm's half-life can often be measured in weeks. 48
Therefore, as discussed in Part IV, regulators must first implement transparency
initiatives to assist in tracking HFT, which will subsequently assist in
determining a proper HfIFT regulatory regime.
1. Liquidity Provision
Market liquidity generally refers to the ease in which market participants
can transact; it is the market's ability to absorb large purchases or sales without
41 BRADLEY & LITAN, supra note 24, at 24.
4 2 1d
43 ALDRIDGE, supra note 11, at 27.
44 See PEREZ, supra note 36, at 48 ("Low latency, in nearly every case, is very
important for high-frequency trading firms, but the degree of importance depends on the
strategy and how often it is executed.").
45 Concept Release on Equity Market Structure, 75 Fed. Reg. 3594, 3607-08 (proposed
Jan. 21, 2010) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pt. 242) (discussing the SEC's classification of
four broad HFT strategy types: passive market making, arbitrage, structural, and directional).
46 GOMBER ET AL., supra note 13, at 24.
47 See David S. Hilzenrath, SEC Still Concerned About High-Frequency Trading,
WASH. POST, Feb. 23, 2012, at A14, available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/
business/economy/high-frequency-trading-raises-concerns-at-sec/2012/02/22/gIQAfpLdTR
story. html ("The chairman of the Securities and Exchange Commission is worried about the
rise of high-frequency trading ... [but] says regulators still don't know enough to do much
more about it.").4 8 Haldane, supra note 11, at 4.
1464 [Vol. 73:6
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significantly impacting prices. 4 9 Traditionally, market makers, or specialists, are
the mainstays of liquidity: they stand on the floors of exchanges ready and
willing to act on both the buy- and sell-side of a transaction immediately upon
receiving orders. 50 As compensation for performing this important function,
market makers earn a spread between the bid (the price at which a buyer will
pay for a share of stock) and the ask (the price at which a seller will sell a share
of stock). 51 Spreads are transaction costs, and the primary factor in reducing this
cost is the rate of transactions: "[t]he greater the frequency of transacting, the
lower will be the cost of waiting in a trading queue of specified length, and,
therefore, the lower will be the spreads that traders are willing to submit to
preempt positions in the trading queue." 52
Market making is not without downsides, and the market maker also earns
the spread as a type of insurance for bearing certain risks.53 A high spread
implies greater risk, such as when less willing buyers and sellers exist, and the
market maker is exposed to the risk of holding inventory, i.e., shares of stock.54
On the other hand, reduced spreads function as an illustration of higher market
liquidity. 55 A lower spread means the market maker is better able to absorb buy
and sell orders and execute them with little pricing impact.56 As liquidity
improves, execution certainty and price efficiency also improve.57
Today, 1-FT traders using a liquidity-provision strategy act as traditional
market makers, and are the markets' principal liquidity providers. 58 HFT allows
49Timothy F. Geithner, President and CEO, Fed. Reserve Bank of N.Y., Keynote
Address at the 8th Annual Risk Convention and Exhibition, Global Association of Risk
Professionals (Feb. 28, 2007), available at http://www.newyorkfed.org/newsevents/speeches
/2007/gei070228.html.
50 See Harold Demsetz, The Cost of Transacting, 82 Q. J. ECON. 33, 35-37 (1968).
Ironically, Demsetz, writing in 1968, mentions in passing the difficulty in completely
computerizing the market maker's role, as it involves "judgment, investment, and risk-
taking." Id. at 38.
51 See id. at 35 37. Market makers earn this spread by matching market orders (the
buyer or seller wishes their trade to be executed immediately at the going market value) and
limit orders (the buyer or seller has a minimum or maximum cap on the price at which they
are willing to buy or sell). The more rapidly market orders arrive, the sooner the limit orders
will be executed. Id. at 40-41.
52 1d. at 41.
5 3 Market makers face two problems: the first is an inventory management problem
the amount of stock to hold and the price at which to buy and sell. Haldane, supra note 11, at
7. "The market maker earns a bid-ask spread in return for solving this problem since they
bear the risk that [the stock for sale] loses value." Id. The second is an information
management problem: the risk of trading with someone possibly better informed about true
prices than is the market maker himself, and it earns the bid-ask spread since he also bears
this risk. Id.
54 See id.
5 5 See id.
56 See id.
571d.; see also Hasbrouck & Saar, supra note 34, at 21 28.
5 8 BRADLEY & LITAN, supra note 24, at 20.
2012] 1465
OHIO STATE LA W JOURNAL
for fast transactions to occur, thereby narrowing spreads, lessening market risks,
and improving efficiency. 59
An HFT liquidity-provision strategy's primary sources of profits stem from
two sources: (1) earning the bid-ask spread; and (2) capturing any liquidity
rebates offered by exchanges. 60 Regarding profits by earning the spread, 1-1FT
employing this strategy act as traditional market makers, yet do not have formal
obligations to quote in markets in which they are active. 6 1 With respect to
liquidity rebates, exchanges provide these as an additional incentive to provide
liquidity. 62 A rebate trader hopes to make money off the rebate, rather than on
the price movement of the stock. 63 Therefore, the key is to quickly get in and
out of a stock in order to capture the rebate without risking a loss on the price-
it "can generate an enormous volume of orders and high cancellation rates of
5 91d.; GOMBER ET AL., supra note 13, at 30 31. Twenty years ago, spreads could
sometimes reach twenty-five cents per share; today, shares are often as little as one cent.
MacKenzie, supra note 22, at 17. Also, see generally Hasbrouck & Saar, supra note 34, for
an in-depth analysis on narrower price spreads as a result of low-latency trading. Reduced
spreads also decrease trading costs for large institutions, and these savings are passed
directly on to pensioners and other investors. BRADLEY & LITAN, supra note 24, at 14.
60 Haldane, supra note 11, at 7.
6 1 GOMBER ET AL., supra note 13, at 25. Market making rules and obligations vary
between exchanges, but most major exchanges, including the NYSE, the Toronto Stock
Exchange, the London Stock Exchange, and the Deutsche Bourse, all "designate market
makers with affirmative obligations to supply liquidity for at least some stocks." Hendrik
Bessembinder, Jia Hao & Michael L. Lemmon, Why Designate Market Makers? Affirmative
Obligations and Market Quality (June 2011) (unpublished paper), available at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract-id-989061. The danger of not having quote
obligations is illustrated in the flash crash of 2010, when HFT traders pulled out of the
market thereby drying up liquidity. See infra Part III.A.
62 GOMBER ET AL., supra note 13, at 26 ("In order to attract liquidity providers and react
to increasing competition among markets, some trading venues have adopted asymmetric
pricing: members removing liquidity from the market ... are charged a higher fee while
traders who submit liquidity to the market ... are charged a lower fee or are even provided a
rebate.").
6 3 Admin, Rebate Trading, TRADINGSIM BLOG (June 17, 2011),
http://tradingsim.com/blog/rebate-trading/. To illustrate how the rebate-capture operates,
assume an institutional investor is willing to buy shares in a stock in a range of $1.00 to
$1.05. The investor places an order for 100 shares at $1.00, and subsequently places another
order for 500 shares at the same price. An HFT using a rebate-capture strategy will place a
bid for the same stock at $1.01 whoever had been selling at $1.00 will now sell at the
higher offer price of $1.01. The rebate-capture HFT now owns shares at $1.01 and earned
the rebate of, say, 1/4 penny per share bought. It will then immediately sell the shares to the
institutional investor at $1.01, gaining no return from the sale, but earning another rebate for
the second offer. This example is taken from SAL L. ARNUK & JOSEPH SALUZZI, THEMIS
TRADING LLC, Toxic EQUITY TRADING ORDER FLOW ON WALL STREET: THE REAL FORCE
BEHIND THE EXPLOSION IN VOLUME AND VOLATILITY, available at http://www.
themistrading.com/article-files/0000/0348/Toxic Equity TradingonWallStreet 12-17-
08.pdf.
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90% or more."64 But above all, it relies on speed: the first trader that is able to
adjust its limit orders, or buy and sell orders at market moves, will be at the "top
of the book"-it will be first in line to execute trades, earning the spread and
any associated rebate. 65
2. Arbitrage
Arbitrage strategies exploit pricing differences between common securities
quoted on competing trading platforms. 66 For example, Stock A could be listed
on Exchange X for $1.01 and simultaneously listed on Exchange Z for $1.02.
An 1IFT algorithm employing an arbitrage strategy would purchase the stock on
Exchange X for $1.01, and sell it on Exchange Z for $1.02. Pricing
discrepancies usually exist for fractions of a second, and low-latency HFT
technology is useful in exploiting such opportunities. 67
One subset that heavily uses quantitative and computational elements is
statistical arbitrage and pairs trading.68 This strategy uses data mining, statistics,
and artificial intelligence to track stocks with fundamentals or market-based
similarities. 69 When one stock in a pair outperforms the other stock, the poorer
performing stock is bought long-the expectation is that it will climb towards
its outperforming partner-while the outperformer is sold short.70 This strategy
propagates price information: it predicts the price movements of stocks that
have not yet moved using the data of similar stocks that are currently moving.7 1
This strategy is an important mechanism for transferring liquidity from a stock
that is moving to a stock that is stagnating, thereby improving price
efficiency. 72
Understanding the difference between, for instance, a liquidity-provision
strategy and an arbitrage strategy is important in promulgating a regulatory
regime. While statistical arbitrage is an important mechanism in transferring
market liquidity and propagating price information, blanket regulations that
cover both a liquidity-provision strategy and an arbitrage trading strategy would
64Concept Release on Equity Market Structure, 75 Fed. Reg. 3594, 3607 (proposed
Jan. 21, 2010) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pt. 242).
65 PEREZ, supra note 36, at 10.
66 See ALDRIDGE, supra note 11, at 4.
67 See GOMBER ET AL., supra note 13, at 27 28.6 8 PEREZ, supra note 36, at 19.
69Id. For example, one trader described an arbitrage scheme that involved shares of
Southwest Airlines, Delta, and ExxonMobil. A rise in the price of oil benefitted Exxon's
shares, and hurt Delta's, but because Southwest entered into futures contracts to hedge
against oil pricing risk, it remained neutral. A rough equation developed: Delta +
ExxonMobil - Southwest; if that equation temporarily broke down, a pairs trader would
jump in and buy shares of a mispriced stock in the equation. This example was taken from
MacKenzie, supra note 22, at 16.
7 0 PEREZ, supra note 36, at 19-20.
7 1 Id. at 147.
7 2 See id. at 147-48.
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be counterproductive. As discussed in Part II.B. 1, liquidity provision plays a
crucial role in the markets: in times of market stress, it is desirable for liquidity
providers to remain market participants to reduce price impact and volatility. 73
Regulations providing incentives for such HFT traders would be beneficial to
the market; yet, these same incentives provided to an LIFT using an arbitrage
strategy might exacerbate market stress in a volatile period.74 For example, if a
trader input an incorrect order, 75 and pricing information became incorrect in
one stock, it would be harmful for arbitragers to use this information to trade on
paired stocks, with one being incorrectly priced. 76 Instead, to limit the spread of
incorrect pricing data, it is more useful for arbitragers to shut down during
periods with clearly erroneous pricing information.
3. Predatory
Despite its benefits in improving liquidity and price efficiency, HFT can be
used in manipulative ways; 77 certain strategies use speed and volume to earn
consistent gains to the detriment of other market participants, mainly large
institutional investors.7 8 "Latency arbitrage" is the general practice of exploiting
access to direct data feeds and co-located servers to impair prices at which other
traders are able to trade. 7 9 By being the fastest obtainer of market data via co-
location arrangements and data center feeds, HFT traders profit by exploiting
slower market participants who offer executions at stale prices.80
For example, "stuffing" involves an HFT trader submitting an excessively
large number of orders to the market, generating congestion on an exchange. 8 1
7 3 See supra Part II.B. 1 and infra Part III.A.
74 See PEREZ, supra note 36, at 147.
75 Similar to the events of the flash crash, discussed infra Part III.A.
76 See discussion infra Part III.A.
77 The blogosphere's accusations regarding HFT are rampant. See, e.g., Academic
Paper Questions HIFT Role in Volatility and Correlation, THEMIS TRADING BLOG (Aug. 24,
2011), http://blog.themistrading.com/academic-paper-questions-hft-role-in-volatility-and-
correlation/; Tyler Durden, HFT Quote Stuffing Market Manipulation Caught in the Act,
ZEROHEDGE (Aug. 25, 2011, 3:38 PM), http://www.zerohedge.com/news/hft-quote-stuffing-
market-manipulation-caught-act; HIFT Algorithms Running Wild, NANEX.NET (Jan. 12,
2012), http://www.nanex.net/aqck/2685.HTML.
7 8 SAL ARNUK & JOSEPH SALUZZI, THEMIS TRADING LLC, LATENCY ARBITRAGE: THE
REAL POWER BEHIND PREDATORY HIGH FREQUENCY TRADING (2009), available at
http://www.themistrading.com/article files/0000/0519/THEMIS TRADING White Paper
-- Latency Arbitrage -- December 4 2009.pdf ("[i]t is about using HFT
techniques ... to determine what kind of institutional algo orders are in the market, such as
those driven by commonly used volume weighted average price (VWAP) formulas, and how
those orders will react if the bid / offer of a stock moves up or down.").
79 GOMBER ET AL., supra note 13, at 29-30.
80Concept Release on Equity Market Structure, 75 Fed. Reg. 3594, 3608 (proposed
Jan. 21, 2010) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pt. 242).
81 Bruno Biais & Paul Woolley, High Frequency Trading 7 (Mar. 2011) (preliminary
paper), available at http://idei.fr/doc/conf/pwri/biais pwri 0311 .pdf.
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Due to the unusually high volume of trades, non-HFT traders do not have a
clear view of their orders' statuses, making it difficult to execute additional
trades. 82 HIFT traders are then able to execute trades at slow traders' expense. 83
Similarly, "smoking" is an HFT scheme that exploits slow traders by offering
attractive limit orders, then quickly revising these prices to take advantage of an
unsuspecting slow trader's market order.84
These strategies are not mere accusations: the Financial Industry Regulatory
Authority (FINRA) recently fined Trillium Brokerage Services, an HIFT firm,
over $2 million for what the regulatory agency called an "[i]llicit [e]quities
[t]rading [s]trategy." 85 The firm engaged in a strategy that placed numerous
orders it had no intention of filling to create the appearance of buy- or sell-side
pressure. 86 It essentially baited unsuspecting market participants into executing
trades at illegitimately high or low prices, exploiting these contra-side
participants for its own gain. 87 The technique is called "spoofing" and Trillium
executed the strategy over 46,000 times. 88
Further contributing to fears of manipulation was an incident in the summer




85 Press Release, Fin. Indus. Regulatory Auth., FINRA Sanctions Trillium Brokerage
Services, LLC, Director of Trading, Chief Compliance Officer, and Nine Traders $2.26
Million for Illicit Equities Trading Strategy (Sep. 13, 2010), available at
http://www.finra.org/Newsroom/NewsReleases/2010/P121951.
86 Id. This is similar to a strategy where HFT algorithms place numerous immediate-or-
cancel (IOC) orders to move the price up and discover the maximum limit order for the
contra-side institutional algorithm. See Tobin Harshaw, Weekend Opinionator: Is Wall Street
Picking Our Pockets?, N.Y. TIMES (July 24, 2009, 9:07 PM), http://opinionator.blogs.
nytimes.com/2009/07/24/weekend-opinionator-is-wall-street-picking-our-pockets/. More
recently, questions circulated over whether HFT traders contributed to the botched Facebook
IPO on NASDAQ, where rapidly cancelled orders came in between the two millisecond
timespan needed to calculate price the exchange had to manually override the continuous
order placement previously in place, which subsequently delayed order confirmations and
created confusion for many. Telis Demos, "Raindrops" raise questions after Facebook 1PO,
FIN. TIMES (May 21, 2012, 1:29 AM), http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/O/cle84ac6-a2c8-11el-
826a-00144feabdc0.html#axzz20cMC 1 szk; Barry Ritholtz, How Facebook Fucked Up Its
Own IPO, THE BIG PICTURE (May 22, 2012, 7:21 AM), http://www.ritholtz.com/blog/2012/
05/how-facebook-fucked-up-its-own-ipo/.
8 7 Press Release, Fin. Indus. Regulatory Auth., supra note 85.
8 81d. For a more detailed explanation of the mechanics of a "spoofing" trade, see Biais
& Woolley, supra note 81, at 8; see also Barry Ritholtz, FINRA Censures "Illicit Equities
Trading Strategy" (HFT Trading), THE BIG PICTURE (Sept. 14, 2010, 9:06 AM),
http://www.ritholtz.com/blog/2010/09/finra-censures-illicit-equities-trading-strategy-hft-
trading/ ("46,000 quotes over the course of a few hours let alone seconds--should be
unlawful."). Note, Ritholtz terms Trillium's actions "quote stuffing," but it is more
congruent to Biais and Woolley's definition of"spoofing."
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investment bank, was arrested for stealing his employer's HFT source code.89
The assistant U.S. Attorney handling the bail hearing revealed to the court a
startling piece of information: "The bank has raised the possibility that there is a
danger that somebody who knew how to use this program could use it to
manipulate markets in unfair ways." 90 If Goldman actually did provide this
information to the U.S. Attorney, the question arises: what prevents Goldman or
any other HFT trader from misusing its HFT code to manipulate markets?9 1
The basis for regulating and preventing these predatory strategies is the
SEC's broad view of manipulation on the open market, whereby the trader's
"sole intent" in placing an order is to move the price of a stock. 92 Under this
view, manipulation occurs when a trader would not have bought or sold a stock
without a manipulative intent. 93 The Second and Third Circuits have rejected
the "sole intent" test, in favor of an "inaccurate information" test, where in
addition to manipulative intent the trader must also inject inaccurate
information into the market. 94 Courts have not faced the question of whether
market manipulation occurs in HFT predatory strategies; 95 however, these
8 9 See generally United States v. Aleynikov, 785 F. Supp. 2d 46 (S.D.N.Y. 2011). In its
denial for Aleynikov's motion for a new trial, the District Court noted that HFT traders are
"extremely secretive about the various aspects of their [HFT] trading systems." Id. at 51.
The programmer, Sergey Aleynikov, was convicted of violating the Economic Espionage
Act and the Interstate Transportation of Stolen Property Act. Patricia Hurtado, Ex-Goldman
Programmer Aleynikov's Conviction Upheld by Judge, BLOOMBERG (Mar. 16, 2011), http://
www.bloomberg.com/news/2011-03-16/ex-goldman-programmer-aleynikov-s-conviction-is-
upheld-by-trial-judge.html. Aleynikov's conviction was subsequently reversed. United
States v. Alyenikov, No. 11-1126, 2012 WL 591980, at *1 (2d Cir. Feb. 17, 2012); see also
Patricia Hurtado, Ex-Goldman Programmer Freed After Theft Conviction Thrown Out,
BLOOMBERG (Feb. 18, 2012), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2012-02-17/ex-goldman-
programmer-s-conviction-overturned-on-appeal.html. In a surprising twist, the Manhattan
district attorney later brought state felony charges against Aleynikov for the "unlawful use of
secret scientific material and duplication of computer-related material." Peter Lattman,
Former Goldman Programmer Is Arrested Again, N.Y. TIMES DEALBOOK (Aug. 9, 2012,
5:06 PM), http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2012/08/09/ex-goldman-programmer-is-arrested-
again/.
90 Jonathan Weil, Goldman Sachs Loses Grip on Its Doomsday Machine, BLOOMBERG
(July 8, 2009, 9:00 PM), http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid-newsarchive&
sid-aFeyqdzYcizc.
91Id.
92 David L. Kornblau et al., Market Manipulation and Algorithmic Trading: The Next
Wave of Regulatory Enforcement?, 44 SEC. REG. & L. REP. 369, 370 (2012).
9 3 1d
94d.; see also ATSI Commc'ns, Inc. v. Shaar Fund, Ltd., 493 F.3d 87, 100 (2d Cir.
2007) ("[C]ourts generally ask whether a transaction sends a false pricing signal to the
market."); GFL Advantage Fund, Ltd. v. Colkitt, 272 F.3d 189, 205 (3d Cir. 2001)
("Requiring a Section 10(b) plaintiff to establish that the alleged manipulator injected
'inaccurate information' into the market.., cures th[e] problem [of determining which
activities artificially affect prices].").
9 5 The Dodd-Frank Act recently expanded the CFTC's enforcement powers against
market manipulators. Most notably it defined disruptive trading practices, which some
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regulators are unlikely to limit their investigations into HFT and other
algorithmic trading merely because the manipulation standard is unclear.96
Regulators frequently cite the flash crash of May 6, 2010 as their basis for
investigating HFT.
III. THE FLASH CRASH OF 2010 AND PUBLIC PERCEPTION
Some critics of HFT assert that the common academic arguments
supporting HFT as increasing market efficiency, i.e., that HFT adds liquidity
and tightens spreads, should be viewed skeptically as many of those authors
have vested interests in supporting certain parties. 97 Most of this research shows
that HFT alleviates liquidity problems and increases market efficiency in
peaceful market periods, as discussed in section II.B. However, HFT
contributes to market volatility in stressful periods by halting trades and drying
up liquidity. 98 Part III of this Note uses the market events of May 6, 2010,
commonly known as the "flash crash," to show that HFT did not trigger the
crash, but propagated the ensuing downward spiral in prices by halting their
trades and removing market liquidity. The flash crash's lasting effect is that
minor computer errors have damaged the markets' credibility in reflecting
accurate price information, which has reduced investor confidence. 99 As such,
regulators are correct to impose regulations that limit the risk of another market
failure like the flash crash of 2010.
A. Market Events of May 6, 2010: HFT Responses to Volatility
The official report on the flash crash, issued by a joint advisory committee
comprised of staffs from both the Commodity Futures Trading Commission
expect will be useful in bringing future enforcement actions against algorithmic traders. See
Kornblau et al., supra note 92, at 370.
9 6 1d at 371.
9 7 European Regulators Summarize The Drivers and Risks of HFT, THEMIS TRADING
(Nov. 15, 2011), http://blog.themistrading.com/european-regulators-summarize-the-drivers-
and-risks-of-hft/.
9 8 Haldane, supra note 11, at 8 9.
99 Today, institutions are the largest and most influential investors. See THE ASPEN
INST., OVERCOMING SHORT-TERMISM: A CALL FOR A MORE RESPONSIBLE APPROACH TO
INVESTMENT AND BUSINESS MANAGEMENT 2 (2009). The increasing emphasis placed on
short-run price performance and short-run returns by institutional investors plays out
negatively in a market where ultrafast algorithms trade in microseconds. Some market
watchers have described the need, generally, for such investors to return to longer-run
strategies of "patient" capital, aligned interests of financial intermediaries and investors, and
improved investor-side disclosures. Id. at 3 5. The implication is that the regulatory impetus
is not to protect retail investors, but rather institutional investors who may be targeted by
HFT. Cf Indiviglio, supra note 20 (regarding the link between wild stock market swings and
drops in consumer confidence and spending due to public fears concerning personal
investments).
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(CFTC) and the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), does not directly
blame HFT firms for starting the dramatic and rapid price plummets. 100 Instead,
the Report notes an already tense market. Trading on May 6 began with
uncertainty due to troubling political and economic news regarding the
European debt crisis. 10 1 By 1:00 p.m., widespread negative market sentiment
caused increased price volatility in select individual securities. 10 2
Clearly, the markets were jittery as a result of the European turmoil that
day. Amid this already volatile trading day was a mutual fund trader initiating
an unusually large program to sell 75,000 E-Mini S&P 500 futures contracts
(the E-Mini), 10 3 valued at a total of approximately $4.1 billion. 10 4 For this large
75,000 E-Mini contracts sale, the trader used an algorithm to manage the sale of
this huge block of orders, but mistakenly input commands into the algorithm:
the commands accounted for volume, but not price or time. 10 5 The firm had
10 0 U.S. COMMODITY FUTURES TRADING COMM'N & U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM'N,
FINDINGS REGARDING THE MARKET EVENTS OF MAY 6, 2010: REPORT OF THE STAFFS OF THE
CFTC AND SEC TO THE JOINT ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON EMERGING REGULATORY ISSUES
(2010) [hereinafter JOINT REPORT]; see also U.S. COMMODITY FUTURES TRADING COMM'N
& U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM'N, RECOMMENDATIONS REGARDING REGULATORY RESPONSES
TO THE MARKET EVENTS OF MAY 6, 2010: SUMMARY REPORT OF THE JOINT CFTC-SEC
ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON EMERGING REGULATORY ISSUES 2 (2011) [hereinafter SUMMARY
REPORT] ("The broad, visible, and often controversial, topic of... HFT ... has been
pervasive in our discussions and in comments received from others. Rather than detail
specific recommendations about HFT[,] ... steps to address issues associated with this
practice are evident throughout our report."). The Joint Report may have even offered some
vindication for HFT firms, but "[t]hat may not save them from stricter rules." The Flash
Crash: Autopsy, supra note 19, at 108.
101 JOINT REPORT, supra note 100, at 1.
102 d. Just before the crash, at approximately 2:30 p.m., the S&P 500 volatility index
(VIX) was up 2 2 .5 % and ten-year U.S. Treasury yields fell as investors fled to safer
securities, conversely causing the Dow Jones Industrial Average (DJIA) to drop by roughly
2.5%. Id.
1031d. at 2. A futures contract is "an agreement to purchase or sell a commodity for
delivery in the future at a price that is determined when the contract is bought or sold." U.S.
COMMODITY FUTURES TRADING COMM'N & U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM'N, PRELIMINARY
FINDINGS REGARDING THE MARKET EVENTS OF MAY 6, 2010: REPORT OF THE STAFFS OF THE
CFTC AND SEC TO THE JOINT ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON EMERGING REGULATORY ISSUES
app. B-1 (May 18, 2010) [hereinafter PRELIMINARY FINDINGS]. Index futures, like the E-
Mini S&P 500, are financial instruments through which traders buy and sell contracts for a
standardized value of a stock index to be executed on a future date and set price. Id. at app.
B-3. These index futures contracts are primarily used by financial institutions and other
market participants as risk management tools. Id.
104 JOINT REPORT, supra note 100, at 2. The Joint Report notes that a market participant
has a few options when executing a large trade: the participant can use an intermediary to
execute a block trade to manage the position; the participant can choose to manually enter
orders into the market; or the participant can use an algorithm to manage the sale, taking
price, time and/or volume into consideration to meet the participant's needs. Id.
105 Id. In accounting for only volume, and not price or time, the algorithm dumped a
large number of futures contracts into the market in an unusually short amount of time. Id If
the price and/or time functions were factored in, the sales would have slowed, thereby
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executed an E-Mini sale on a similar scale before, but it had used both manual
and automated execution mechanisms-taking into account price, time and
volume-which took more than five hours to complete the first 75,000 E-Mini
contracts. 106 On May 6, however, when the markets were already under
significant stress, it executed a sell algorithm targeting only volume, not price
or time-the 75,000 contracts sale executed in just twenty minutes. 107
The point to highlight is that the algorithm that triggered the crash was not a
sophisticated, ultra-low latent HIFT algorithm. 10 8 Where HIFT comes in is when
the sell algorithm first commenced: initially, HIFT algorithms were the first
buyers of the contracts, and it looked like the market would absorb the huge
sell-off. 10 9 However, to counterbalance their purchases to remain "market
neutral," 110 these HFT algorithms bought and sold the contracts simultaneously,
in what the Report termed a "hot-potato" effect. 111 The non-HFT algorithm that
initiated the huge sell order "responded to the increase in volume by unloading
the contracts faster, pushing prices down further." 112 By 2:45:27 p.m., the price
of E-Mini futures "had declined by more than [five] per cent from its level just
four and a half minutes earlier." 113 Prices moved so quickly that buyers were
either unable or unwilling to provide buy-side liquidity. 114
In reaction to the volatility in the E-Mini market, a significant number of
participants completely withdrew from other markets. 115 Many liquidity
providers in the equities markets, including HFT traders, paused trading due to
alleviating sell-side pressure. The mistake resulted in the largest net change in a daily
position of any E-Mini trader year-to-date in 2010. Id.
106 1d.
107 Id.
108 MacKenzie, supra note 22, at 17. Instead, the algorithm is believed to have belonged
to Waddell & Reed, a Kansas City investment manager who was attempting to protect a
large market position from further declines. Id.
10 91d. ("Algorithmic trading was still in the benign zone that it occupies most of the
time: electronic market makers and arbitrageurs were 'providing liquidity' ... making it
possible for the volume participation algorithm to do its intended large-scale selling."); see
also JOINT REPORT, supra note 100, at 3.
ll 0 This is a mechanism to limit risk. See MacKenzie, supra note 22, at 17 ("[HFT
traders] usually program their algorithms to be 'market neutral,' in other words to insulate
their trading positions from fluctuations in overall market levels.").
111 JOINT REPORT, supra note 100, at 3. In the fourteen-second period between 2:45:13
p.m. and 2:45:27 p.m., 27,000 E-Mini futures contracts traded via HFT. JOINT REPORT,
supra note 100, at 3.
112 The Flash Crash: Autopsy, supra note 19, at 108.
113 MacKenzie, supra note 22, at 17.
1 4 See id.
115 JOINT REPORT, supra note 100, at 5. In interviews conducted for the Joint Report,
some market participants said they feared that the price drops meant some catastrophic event
had occurred of which they had not yet heard; others believed that the data feeds carrying
price information had a technical glitch and stopped trading in response. Id; see also
MacKenzie, supra note 22, at 17.
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the sudden and drastic price declines. 116 Although some HFT traders continued
to trade throughout the volatile period, others reduced trading activity or
completely withdrew from the market, making HFT traders net sellers as
volume increased.117
Official market makers attempted to halt their trades, as well. 118 However,
these participants are required to quote prices at which they would buy and sell
shares in the markets in which they are active. 119 Therefore, even when they
want to stop trading, they cannot. They instead use a scheme known as a "stub
quote" to meet their formal obligations of continuous trading, while effectively
pausing trades. 120 Stub quotes reduce the bids in shares of a stock to the lowest
possible value ($0.01), and the asks to the maximum possible value
($99,999.99), making the bids and asks so unattractive that no rational trader
would take a market maker up on these quotes. 12 1
By 2:40 p.m. on May 6, liquidity had vanished so drastically that the stub
quotes for some securities were the only available prices left at which to
trade. 122 Between 2:40 p.m. and 3:00 p.m., over 20,000 trades across 300
securities, many of which were retail investors' market orders (orders to simply
buy or sell at the best available market price), were executed at prices that were
60% or more away from their price before 2:40 p.m., i.e., a "normal" level. 123
Two startling instances of pricing absurdities due to stub quote executions were
the cases of Accenture and Sotheby's. In Accenture's case, shares of its stock
traded at around $40 per share at 2:47 p.m., only to plummet to $0.01 at 2:48
p.m. 124 In Sotheby's case, shares of its stock opened the day at $34.61, later
reaching $100,000 only to close at $33.125 Prices were "dislocated to the point
where they had no information content whatsoever."' 26
116 JOINT REPORT, supra note 100, at 4. The Report later states that "liquidity providers"
include traditional market makers and HFT traders, among others. Id. at 35.
"171d at 5.





123 JOINT REPORT, supra note 100, at 6; see also MacKenzie, supra note 22, at 18.
124 Matt Phillips, Accenture: Went to a Penny at 2:48p.m., WSJ BLOGS: MARKETBEAT
(May 6, 2010, 4:17 PM), http://blogs.wsj.com/marketbeat/2010/5/06/accenture-went-to-a-
penny-at-248-pm/.12 5 Stephen Grocer, Six Mega Drops of the Flash Crash; Sam Adams Goes Flat, WSJ
BLOGS: DEAL JOURNAL (May 6, 2010, 5:47 PM), http://blogs.wsj.com/deals/2010/05/06/
four-mega-drops-of-the-flash-crash-sam-adams-goes-flat/. Other stocks with bizarre price
movements at similar times were Exelon, CenterPoint Energy, TransMontaigne Partners,
Impax Laboratories, and Samuel Adams. See id126 Haldane, supra note 11, at 12.
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B. The Dangers of HFT
While HIFT did not spark the flash crash, it is clear that it contributes to
market volatility in times of stress. The "hot-potato" effect and the endogenous
self-exciting nature of HFT certainly contributed to the cascading downward
spiral of E-Mini futures, and later, other stock prices. 127 However, the
exchanges had in place mechanisms to correct these market failures. With
respect to the E-Mini, the Chicago Mercantile Exchange's circuit breaker
triggered at 2:45:28 p.m. to prevent a further cascade of prices. 128 The circuit
breaker paused trading on the E-Mini for five seconds, and in that short
timeframe, sell-side pressure eased and buy-side interest increased allowing
prices to stabilize shortly after trading resumed. 129
With respect to equities, market-wide circuit breakers were not triggered. 130
In fact, the cause of the nonsensical stock prices was the fact that HFT traders,
along with other liquidity providers, exited the market.131 But market stability
returned gradually on its own, and prices largely stabilized by 3:00 p.m. 132 In an
ex post regulatory move, FINRA met with the exchanges after markets closed
that day and agreed to break (i.e., cancel) all trades that occurred during the
flash crash. 133
What does this mean for HFT and market failures? The day's problems
were corrected, and there has not been a market-wide failure similar to the flash
crash since it occurred in May 2010.134 Indeed, one study declares that the
127 See D. SORNETTE & S. VON DER BECKE, CRASHES AND HIGH FREQUENCY TRADING:
AN EVALUATION OF RISKS POSED BY HIGH-SPEED ALGORITHMIC TRADING 11 (2011) (report
commissioned as part of the UK Government's Foresight Project, The Future of Computer
Trading in Financial Markets).
128 JOINT REPORT, supra note 100, at 4.
12 9 Id
130 d. at 6.
131 See supra text accompanying notes 109 17; see also JOINT REPORT, supra note 100,
at 45-48 (discussing specific findings regarding HFT in the markets that day). The Report
concludes, "[I]t appears that the 17 HFT firms traded with the price trend on May 6 and, on
both an absolute and net basis, removed significant buy liquidity from the public quoting
markets during the downturn." Id. at 48.
132 See MacKenzie, supra note 22, at 18.
133 JOINT REPORT, supra note 100, at 6.
134 Sornette and von der Becke argue that mini flash crashes occur rather frequently in
individual stocks. They cite, among other examples, crashes in shares of Progress Energy in
September 2010, Apple in February 2011, as well as a sharp move in the USD/Yen on the
currency market one month later. See SORNETTE & VON DER BECKE, supra note 127, at 13;
see also Philip Elmer-DeWitt, Snapshot of an Apple Flash Crash, CNNMONEY (Feb. 10,
2011, 2:50 PM), http://tech.fortune.cnn.com/2011/02/10/snapshot-of-an-apple-flash-crash/.
A second crash in Apple shares occurred in March 2012, where the stock "plunged [nine]
percent on a single trade," triggering circuit breakers. John Melloy, Apple Flash Crash:
Stock Halted After Trade Causes 9% Plunge, CNBC FASTMONEY (Mar. 23, 2012, 8:12 PM),
http://www.cnbc.com/id/46835129/Apple Flash Crash StockHaltedAfterTradeCauses
9 Plunge. Sornette and von der Becke believe that the activity levels of these securities
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events of May 6 are "not representative of the manner in which low-latency
activity impacts market conditions outside of such extreme episodes."' 135
The real crux of the HFT issue then is that it impacts investors' confidence
in the markets' ability to provide accurate pricing information. 136 The flash
crash, in which stock prices were "dislocated to the point where they had no
information content whatsoever,"' 137 compounded with the negative publicity
HFT predatory strategies receive, 138 causes the public to perceive LIFT as
propagating a rigged game, where prices have little basis in market realities.139
Further adding to this notion is that although HFT comprises a large portion of
daily trading on U.S. markets, a relatively small number of firms are actually
responsible for this surge in volume. 140
The historical purpose and importance of our equity markets is that they
perform a crucial role in financing companies: efficiently matching investors
with growing companies lowers capital costs for businesses. 14 1 in a market
comprised of ultra-fast computers executing huge numbers of orders in mere
seconds, creating the possibility for dramatic price alterations by design or
accidental fluke, investors have little incentive to risk their capital in an
environment where market fundamentals, namely pricing, are increasingly
uncertain. 142 The fact that prices may not reflect their true underlying value at
"point[] to HFT," but concede that the "involvement of HFT is not evident." Id. They use
increased frequency in quotes to base their suggestion that HFT was responsible. See id
135 Hasbrouck & Saar, supra note 34, at 31.
136 See SUMMARY REPORT, supra note 100, at 2 ("[T]he net effect of [May 6, 2010] was
a challenge to investors' confidence in the markets.").
137 Haldane, supra note 11, at 12.
13 8 See supra Part 11.B.3, namely, the public censure of Trillium Brokerage Services,
LLC for using HFT to manipulate stock prices. Furthermore, before the New York Times
published an article on HFT in July 2009, few had heard of it. The article focused on the
manipulative aspects to HFT, and immediately after the article hit newsstands, Senator
Charles Schumer wrote to the SEC telling them to curb flash orders; shortly thereafter, the
British Financial Services Authority, following in the SEC's steps, announced it was
examining HFT's market impact. PEREZ, supra note 36, at 81 83.
139 The mainstream media captures this sentiment. See, e.g., Jeff B. Cohen, 'Chunk'
from "The Goonies" on High Frequency Trades and the Flash Crash, CNBC GUEST BLOG
(Oct. 13, 2011, 11:14 AM), http://www.cnbc.com/id/44875871 /Chunk from The Goonies
on High Frequency Trades and the Flash Crash ("[T]he enormous impact the HFTs
have on the market[] makes it extremely difficult for individual investors to determine if a
200 point increase in the Dow is based upon fantastic economic news or just robo traders
playing footsie with their equations."); Jim Cramer, Jim Cramer's Best Blogs: Repelling
High Frequency Fire, THE STREET (Aug. 6, 2011, 3:25 PM), http://www.thestreet.com/_
yahoo/story/ 11212534/1/jim-cramers-best-blogs.html ("[HFT traders] have a speed edge and
weapons that are like machine guns in World War I and individual investors are foot
soldiers, mowed down by a new technology they can't understand."); 60 Minutes: The Speed
Traders (CBS television broadcast Oct. 10, 2010).
140LARRY TABB, ROBERT IATI & ADAM SUSSMAN, US EQUITY HIGH FREQUENCY
TRADING: STRATEGIES, SIZING AND MARKET STRUCTURE 2 (2009) [hereinafter TABB ET AL.].
141 See BRADLEY & LITAN, supra note 24, at 7.
14 2 But see sources cited supra note 99.
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any given moment is enough of a reason for regulators to step in to ensure
market efficiency.
IV. REGULATORY APPROACHES AND RECOMMENDATIONS
Regulators' goal in HFT oversight should be to restore confidence in the
markets while not detracting from the efficiencies it creates. It is easy to fall
victim to a one-sided approach in understanding HFT: either proponents'
arguments of its undoubted benefits, or detractors' "sometimes exaggerated fear
of out of control computers."' 143 As discussed in Part II.B, HFT is not a
homogenous trading form, and regulators must therefore understand the
participants and their roles in the market. This approach should also be
consistent with the "long-standing view of the SEC and CFTC that market-
based solutions play a preferential role in the efficient functioning of
markets." 144
A. Regulations That Improve Transparency
The first problem regulators face is their lack of knowledge about fIFT.145
As discussed in Part II.B, in order to be effective, regulations governing HFT
must account for the different strategies these firms employ. To institute an
effective regulatory regime, regulators must begin to understand HFT as a
trading method comprised of varied strategies with different goals. Therefore
collecting data on the trading patterns of HFT firms is a logical starting point:
HFT firms should be required to register with the SEC and describe their
strategies in general terms. The SEC has begun this process by adopting Rule
13h-1, "Large Trader Reporting."1 46 Rule 13h-1 (Rule) imposes recordkeeping,
reporting, and limited monitoring requirements on certain registered broker-
14 3 MacKenzie, supra note 22, at 18. Furthermore, HFT lends itself to conspiracy
theories and alleged unfair practices, common to other industry scapegoats. Yet, market
critics and politicians often misplace sources of risk in the system. Until 2008, hedge funds
were said to pose systemic risk to the banking system, yet banks were in fact the risky
entities many hedge funds were burned by Lehman Brothers' failure, for example, while
hedge funds that went under did not cause reported losses beyond their own investors. See
TABB ET AL., supra note 140, at 1.
144 SUMMARY REPORT, supra note 100, at 14.14 5 See Hilzenrath, supra note 47, at A14 ("The chairman of the Securities and Exchange
Commission is worried about the rise of high-frequency trading ... [but] says regulators still
don't know enough to do much more about it."); see also supra note 12 and accompanying
text (regulators do not even have consensus on a precise definition for HFT).
146 See Large Trader Reporting, 76 Fed. Reg. 46,960 (Aug. 3, 2011) (to be codified at 17
C.F.R. pts. 240 and 249) (defining a "large trader" as someone whose "transactions in NMS
securities equal or exceed 2 million shares or $20 million during any calendar day, or 20
million shares or $200 million during any calendar month"); see also Press Release, U.S.
Sec. & Exch. Comm'n, SEC Adopts Large Trader Reporting Regime (July 26, 2011).
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dealers through whom large traders execute their transactions. 147 Though it does
not mention HFT outright, the Rule itself strongly implies that HFT is its
target. 148 The SEC's goal is to identify market participants engaged in
substantial trading activity; obtain information needed to monitor the impact of
those trades on the market; and analyze such market participants' trading
activity. 1
49
Ultimately, large trader reporting should assist regulators in better
understanding which firms comprise the HFT sub-group. It might also minimize
the time it takes regulators to collect market data on HFT traders after trades are
executed, which was one of the problems the SEC faced after the flash crash. 150
However, targeting large traders encompasses the much broader category of
algorithmic trading, which also generate large trades. By being overly inclusive,
regulators' task remains difficult to police manipulative I-FT practices and
quickly and efficiently analyze market data in the event of another flash crash.
Furthermore, the Rule does little to assess and differentiate between strategies: a
liquidity-provision strategy can generate just as many orders as a manipulative
predatory strategy. More focus should be placed on tracking manipulative
practices as opposed to liquidity providers, but the Rule fails to encapsulate this
distinction.151
Imposing requirements on the stock exchanges to monitor I-FT might be a
better alternative than government regulators sifting through enormous amounts
of data. The exchanges already have relationships with HFT traders, as they rent
space to HFT firms in their computer warehouses for co-location purposes. 152
147 Large Trader Reporting, 76 Fed. Reg. 46,960 (Aug. 3, 2011) (to be codified at 17
C.F.R. pts. 240 and 249).14 8 See id. at 46,961 ("[The SEC] is in the process of conducting a broad and critical
look at U.S. market structure in light of the rapid development in trading technology and
strategies."); id ("[P]rofessional market participants ... employ sophisticated trading
methods to trade electronically on multiple venues simultaneously in huge volumes with
great speed."). The final Rule also notes HFT as a significant subcategory of large traders,
whereby the large trader reporting requirement "will provide the Commission a mechanism
for obtaining the information necessary to reliably identify the most significant of these
market participants and promptly and efficiently obtain information on their trading on a
market-wide basis." Id. at 46,963.
14 9 1d
150 1d. ("As the events of May 6, 2010 demonstrated, the reconstruction of trading
activity during an extremely active trading day in our high-speed ... markets can involve an
enormous undertaking to collect uniform data and analyze thousands of products, millions of
trades, and hundreds of millions... of data points.").
151 The Technology Advisory Committee to the CFTC expressed a similar sentiment,
stating that "regulators would waste budget resources by requiring registration and audits of
automated trading algorithms." Silla Brush, High-Frequency Trading Registration Studied
by US. Regulator, BLOOMBERG (June 20, 2012, 7:02 AM), http://www.bloomberg.com/
news/2012-06-20/high-frequency-trading-registration-studied-by-u-s-regulator.html ("Focus
should be on specific behaviors that undermine market integrity irrespective of the means or
pace of order entry.").
15 2 Haldane, supra note 11, at 6.
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Presumably, the exchanges know the players and have a better starting point
than government regulators in attempting to understand 1-FT methods and
strategies. HFT computers are also tied directly into the exchanges' computer
systems which provide the exchanges an advantage in compiling data. On the
other hand, the exchanges have strong incentives to provide free reign to HFT
traders 5 3 : they earn high rents from co-location, and significant fees from large
amounts of trading. The exchanges want 1-FT traders to continue playing a
significant role in the markets, and may not be a reliable regulator.
Regardless of the monitoring system imposed, reporting and filing
requirements are only a start: regulators are behind HFT traders in terms of
technological capacity and understanding. Due to the competitive nature of
1-FT, and the quickly evolving computer codes with half-lives of only a few
weeks, 154 regulatory agencies must recruit skilled programmers who understand
this complex language. This will be difficult given the stakes involved for HIFT
firms: the private sector will be able and willing to pay a good programmer a
highly competitive salary to recruit him or her, and keep them out of the
regulatory side. 155 If regulatory agencies are unable to recruit skilled
programmers in sufficient numbers, they may have to expend considerable costs
in hiring outside consultants who can assist in understanding complex
computing code.
Regulators are also behind in terms of speed and tracking the market in real
time. Currently, there is no single database of comprehensive and readily
accessible data regarding orders and executions, putting regulators at a
significant disadvantage when trying to make sense of enormous amounts of
trading data points. 156 The SEC has proposed a consolidated audit trail (CAT), a
multibillion dollar computer monitoring system that would allow it to keep pace
with the rapidly evolving markets. 157
15 3 See supra note 32 and accompanying text.
154 Haldane, supra note 11, at 4.
155 Sarah N. Lynch & Jonathan Spicer, Exclusive: Regulators Seek Trading Secrets,
REUTERS (Sept. 1, 2011, 7:24 PM), http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/09/01/us-financial-
regulation-algos-idUSTRE7806J420110901 ("'Let's just say the good developers in the
industry are being hired by the industry-not by an SEC salary,' a trader said."). However,
one HFT firm recently provided improved technology and assistance to the SEC, which will
help it better monitor high speed trading. Nathaniel Popper & Ben Protess, To Regulate
Rapid Traders, S.E.C. Turns to One of Them, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 8, 2012, at B1. Some experts
have stated that this collaboration is "the quickest and, at a cost of $2.5 million this year, the
cheapest way for the agency to catch up with the high-speed trading industry." Id.
156 Scott Patterson, SEC Pushes Plan for Audit System, WALL ST. J., Sept. 21, 2011, at
Cl.
157 1d. in July 2012, the SEC voted 3 2 to approve a limited version of the CAT, its goal
being to "track orders, cancellations and executions of all U.S.-listed stocks and options,
across all markets, delivering the data to the SEC in uniform fashion by the next trading
day." Jessica Holzer, SEC Arms Itself to Better Track Trades, WALL ST. J., July 12, 2012, at
C3. However, the approved plan only sets out broad parameters, leaving the exchanges and
FINRA to work out specifics. Id
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However, the CAT may impose an undue burden on market participants:
the SEC will not pay for the project. 158 Instead, it plans on passing the costs
onto stock exchanges, brokerage firms and FINRA, which would likely result in
costs ultimately going to investors and traders. 159 Increased costs on SEC-
regulated exchanges could mean thinning liquidity in U.S. markets. 160 Also
unclear is whether the SEC actually needs the CAT to achieve its goal-it could
build off existing audit trails such as FINRA's Order Audit Trail System
(OATS), thereby reducing unnecessary costs incurred in developing a
completely new system.' 6'
Access to information should not come without limits. Regulators should
avoid intrusive and burdensome inquiries into HFT, resorting to these tactics
only when a firm is under strong suspicion of engaging in manipulative
practices. More specifically, asking a firm directly for computing code is
troubling. Algorithmic code is an HFT firm's intellectual property, where it is
developed at great cost and sometimes over years. The concern is that regulators
will eventually leave their public posts for the private sector, and will take the
knowledge they gained on the job to use against competitors. 162 Therefore,
regulators should avoid requesting algorithmic code, reserving it for the most
serious instances of market failure or manipulation.
Finally, educating the investing public is a key component to restoring
confidence in the markets. While regulatory agencies would restore confidence
through the appearance of an effective regulatory regime, HFT firms best serve
their interests by becoming more transparent in their practices. The principals of
HFT firms should view speaking to financial media outlets as opportunities for
educating the investing public. To date, individuals involved with HFT are
notoriously reluctant to speak to the press: they do not want to disclose top-
secret strategies; their time is better spent on developing algorithms; and they
fear being misrepresented on television or in print. 163 However, rather than
complain that Washington and the financial media do not have the necessary
sophistication to understand HFT's nuance,1 64 the active players in HFT ought
to make themselves available to explain the ways in which they add value to the
markets and investors. Doing so would alleviate suspicions regarding secretive
HFT traders, and would help prevent overly burdensome regulations brought on
by lawmakers reading harsh media reports concerning HFT.165
158 Patterson, supra note 156, at Cl.
1591d. atC2.
160 Id. ("[T]he SEC could create a monster that impacts liquidity in a negative way.").
161 SIFMA, IMPACT OF HIGH FREQUENCY TRADING AND CONSIDERATIONS FOR
REGULATORY CHANGE 7 (2011).
162 Lynch & Spicer, supra note 155.
163 PEREZ, supra note 36, at 45.
164 d 
.165 See id at 81-83.
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B. Regulations That Limit Volatility
New transparency and reporting requirements will help regulators better
oversee trading activity to potentially catch manipulative practices. 166 But
additional steps must be taken to prevent a flash crash-like scenario from
happening again.
HFT's contributory role in the downward cascade of stock prices during the
flash crash was caused by its withdrawal from the markets, pulling out a
significant source of buy-side liquidity. 167 The primary source of liquidity in
today's markets comes from HFT firms engaged in a liquidity-provision
strategy, who effectively act as market makers. 168 Traditionally, market makers
"stand[] ready to buy and sell a particular stock on a regular and continuous
basis at a publicly quoted price." 1 69 Their obligation to continuously quote
prices, irrespective of the market conditions, stem from rules stock exchanges
impose on them. 170 However, the difference between traditional market makers
and HFT market makers is that exchanges impose rules and obligations on
traditional market makers, whereas HIFT liquidity providers have none. 17 1
1IFT traders engaged in a liquidity-provision strategy should therefore be
required to register as market makers on the exchanges on which they trade. 172
Market makers bear considerable risk in the responsibilities they owe to the
market; 1IFT traders should not gain market making benefits in relatively
peaceful periods, while having the ability to stop trading in volatile market
periods. Requiring HFT traders to register as market makers and bringing them
within the scope of an exchange's market making rules creates accountability
on the part of HIFT traders, and will serve to provide some assurance to market
liquidity in the event of another flash crash-like trigger-having an obligation to
166 See Patterson, supra note 156.
167 See supra Part III.A. It is important to note that HFT traders did not have a uniform
response to the events of May 6, 2010. Although some HFT traders exited for reasons
similar to other market participants, such as internal risk controls triggered due to rapidly
plummeting prices, other traders continued to trade. On a net basis, however, high speed
traders were primary sellers during the crash, removing significant buy-side liquidity from
the markets. See JOINT REPORT, supra note 100, at 45-48.
16 8 See supra note 58 and accompanying text.
169Market Maker, U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM'N, http://www.sec.gov/answers/
mktmaker.htm (last modified March 17, 2000); see also supra Part II.B.1.170 See Haldane, supra note 11, at 17.
171 SUMMARY REPORT, supra note 100, at 2 ("In the present environment, where high
frequency and algorithmic trading... [have] essentially eliminated rule-based market maker
obligations, liquidity problems are an inherent difficulty that must be addressed."); see also
Haldane, supra note 11, at 17.
172 Cf. Peter Chapman, Exchanges Balk at Forcing Market Maker Obligations onto
HFTs, TRADERSMAGAZINE.COM (Oct. 29, 2010), http://www.tradersmagazine.com/news/
high-frequency-trading-market-maker-nyse-nasdaq-106601-1.html? ("It would be very
difficult to properly define the responsibilities and correspondent privileges you would give
to market participants.").
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quote prices will ensure that HFT liquidity providers do not exit the market in
volatile periods.
Another mechanism that can be used to incentivize H-FT liquidity providers
to continually supply liquidity irrespective of market conditions is "peak load
pricing."'173 A "peak-load pricing" model would reward trading firms for
staying in the market during periods of high volatility. 174 The idea is for
exchanges to increase the rebates they pay for offers during periods of volatility,
while lowering the rebates during calm periods. 175
While these obligations and incentives work for HFT traders engaged in a
liquidity provision strategy acting as market makers, they are not logical when
applied to an HFT arbitrage strategy. 17 6 Again, understanding the differences
between strategies is crucial. Arbitragers propagate price information, finding
pricing irregularities and trading accordingly. 177 It is wrong to provide
incentives and/or obligations for these 1-IFT traders to remain in the market
during a flash crash, where prices do not accurately reflect the underlying value
of a stock or security. If this were the case, arbitragers would trade according to
incorrect price information, spreading this inaccurate information to other
stocks that are "paired" with a stock affected by a flash crash. 178 Essentially, if
arbitragers were to remain in the market during a flash crash, they would
exacerbate the pricing problems associated with flash crashes. Therefore, unlike
HFT liquidity providers, HFT arbitragers should withdraw from markets during
periods of extreme price volatility. If prices in one stock fluctuate by more than
a certain percentage in a given period of time, HFT arbitragers should halt
trading in that stock and any other paired security. While penalties for trading
may not be necessary, more important is that the incentives for remaining in
markets during volatile periods should not be offered to arbitragers.
Finally, regulators should impose internal risk management requirements
within the HFT firms themselves. For example, firms should have minimum
testing requirements for newly developed algorithms before these are deployed
onto the market. The tests should include simulations of stressful market
conditions to determine how these algorithms will react in a scenario akin to a
flash crash. Risk management controls should also ensure that proper
notifications exist within the HFT firm's computer systems to notify
programmers whether an algorithm becomes overly erratic. Once a notification
is sounded, human programmers should have the capability to intervene with an
out-of-control algorithm. Finally, firms should have set procedures in place in
173 SUMMARY REPORT, supra note 100, at 9.
174 See Jonathan Spicer, "Flash Crash" Panel Mulls Big Market Changes, REUTERS
(Feb. 4, 2011, 3:43 PM), http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/02/04/us-flashcrash-
idUSTRE7134PI20110204. Peak load pricing raises prices during popular times and cuts
pricing during off-times to limit the amount of participants in popular, or peak, times. See id
17
5 Id.176 See supra Part 11.B.2.177 See supra Part 1.B.2.178 See supra Part II.B.2 for a discussion on pairs trading.
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the event that markets hit an extremely volatile period. The firms should file
these procedures with the exchanges on which they trade, so that the exchanges
will be able to better coordinate efforts to limit pricing impacts in the event of
another flash crash. Imposing internal risk controls is a relatively cheap and
easy ex ante precaution that should not be overly intrusive or burdensome on
HFT participants.
V. CONCLUSION
Throughout history, financiers and other market participants have tried to
get ahead of markets by obtaining information faster than other investors. 179
Firms often employ cutting-edge technology to gain these advantages over their
competitors. Yet, technological advancement and increased efficiency is
positive for the overall financial markets' functioning. High frequency trading is
just one example of markets adjusting their structure to technological
improvement. HFT's problem is its secretive nature, potential for manipulative
pricing practices, and the appearance of out-of-control computers that can lead
to inaccurate pricing information. All of these factors lead to other investors'
loss of confidence in the financial markets. Regulators' challenge is to restore
investor confidence by educating the public about HFT through increased
transparency and limiting the potential for another flash crash, without
hindering technological advancement and the efficiencies this creates. Ken
Jennings, eloquently quoting The Simpsons, 180 summed up this sentiment: new
technology with stunning speeds difficult for a human to comprehend should
not be feared for lack of understanding, but embraced for the potential value it
can add to society.
17 9 For example, Nathan Rothschild hired a private intelligence envoy to inform him of
Wellington's victory over Napoleon at Waterloo a full day before the British government
itself had the information. The government expected Wellington's defeat, but Rothschild
used the information in the stock exchange and added to his already significant fortune. See
Martin Fagan, Special Report: Equity Capital Markets Need For Speed Raises Concerns
About Fairness, FIN. TIMES MANDATE, Feb. 1, 2010.
180 See supra note 6 and accompanying text.
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